

NAXALISM: TERRORISM IN INDIA & MEASURES TO FIGHT IT

By: GAURAV HOODA, GAURI SHRIKHANDE
Army Institute of Law, Mohali, Punjab

*“Revolutions are changes attempted or achieved
by force in the constitution of societies”*

- Arthur Bauer

1. The Naxalite movement takes its name from a peasant uprising that took place in May 1967 at Naxalbari .It was led by armed communist revolutionaries, Under the leadership of their ideologue, a 49-year old Communist, Charu Mazumdar, they defined the objective of the new movement as 'seizure of power through an agrarian revolution'.
2. The aim of the Naxalite strategy was the annihilation of the landlords, moneylenders, police, and its informers and those who would prevent them from establishing a stronghold of peasants over the villages and ultimately capture political power in cities[1]. The tactics to achieve it was through guerilla warfare by the peasants to eliminate the landlords and build up resistance against the state's police force which came to help the landlords, and thus gradually set up 'liberated zones' in different parts of the country
3. There were uprisings of peasants and in urban areas with acts of terrorism. However intra-party differences within the movement and the counter insurgency measures of the government led to gradual disintegration of the movement.
4. The uprising at Naxalbari was crushed by the police within a few months. Its continuity can be explained by the persistence and exacerbation of the basic causes that gave it birth - feudal exploitation and oppression over the rural poor, and the Indian state's repressive policies to silence them whenever they protest.

Scope of this study

The scope of this study is to include the following:-

- Background conditions leading to the Naxalite movements with special reference to the Naxalbari uprising and the Srikakulam Naxalite movement.
- The ideology behind the Naxalite movement.
- Contemporary Naxalite movement.
- Recommended methods to tackle the Naxalite problem.

NAXALBARI UPRISING

“The universal and chief cause of revolutionary feeling is the desire of equality.” - Aristotle in his book ‘Politics’

1. Naxalite Problem started in May 1967 from a small village Naxalbari (Siliguri Division of West Bengal) by the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party. Shri Charu Mazumdar spearheaded the movement and has since been accepted as its founder. Large number of educated men and women got attracted towards the revolutionary ideology and philosophy of Mao and Marxism and joined the movement.
2. Ironically enough, although the uprising in Naxalbari in May 1967 was crushed by the police within two months, the Naxalite ideology gained rapid momentum in other parts of West Bengal and India within a few years. By the early 1970s, the Naxalite movement had spread from far-flung areas like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala in the south, to Bihar in the east, and Uttar Pradesh and Punjab in the north.
3. In Punjab rich landlords and policemen were targeted by bands of Naxalites. In West Bengal itself - the birthplace of the Naxalite movement – armed peasants' struggles broke out in Midnapur and Birbhum, where some villages passed over to total Naxalite control during the 1969-70 period.
4. The situation was alarming enough for the Indian government to investigate into its causes. It set up a committee to compile a report. Prepared in 1969, and entitled *The Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian Tensions*, the report acknowledged: "*The basic cause of*

unrest, namely, the defective implementation of laws enacted to protect the interests of the tribals, remains..."

It then added: "*unless this is attended to, it would not be possible to win the confidence of the tribals whose leadership has been taken over by the extremists*". Instead of fully implementing land reforms to alleviate their grievances - as suggested by many impartial observers as well as its own committee of 1969 - the Indian government chose the simplistic path of military suppression of peasant grievances. It unleashed a reign of terror on the Naxalite bases and the villagers who supported them.

5. Apart from the state repression, several splits within the leadership hierarchy of the Naxalite movement in the 1970s weakened its capacity to resist the police and army offensive. Many among Charu Mazumdar's comrades and followers became critical of his tactics of assassination of individual 'class enemies'. By 1972, the Indian state had succeeded in defeating the Naxalite rebellion to some extent – its main trophy being the capture of the ideologue Charu Mazumdar from a Calcutta hideout on July 16, 1972.
6. Mazumdar died in police custody 12 days after his arrest – raising suspicions about the treatment meted out to him by the police. With military suppression of their bases in the villages, detention of their leaders by the police and dissensions within their ranks, the Naxalites reached the end of their movement in the late 1970s. Charu Mazumdar's death marked the end of an important phase in the Naxalite movement which had convulsed large parts of the country for nearly five years [2].
7. Naxalbari was by no means the first peasant uprising to have taken place in India in the recent times. In 1946, there was the *Tebhaga* movement in undivided Bengal, which demanded the reduction in the share of the landlords from one half of the crop to one third. The Telangana insurrection (1946 – 1951) was a much more broad based. It is said that the peasants were able to establish control over 3,000 villages and their influence

extended over several others. The Naxalbari uprising was a much smaller affair by comparison.

8. Here the revolt lasted just 52 days – and that also because the state government prevaricated in the initial stages, and not more than a score of people were killed. But then Naxalbari "left a far reaching impact on the entire agrarian scene throughout India. It was like the premeditated throw of a pebble bringing forth a series of ripples in the water". The significance of the Naxalbari movement is that it represented the first experiment with Maoism in this country under the leadership of a party completely committed to the Chinese path.

THE SRIKAKULAM MOVEMENT

"Covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all." - Thomas Hobbes

1. Srikakulam is in the North Eastern part of Andhra Pradesh. This area had no revolutionary background. In the post-independence era, the communist influence over the area was negligible in the initial stages. The girijans or the hill people comprised about 90% of the total population of Srikakulam district. The traders and the moneylenders in the area took full advantage of the tribals. The exploitation of the tribals created a condition ripe for the birth of the Naxalite movement in the area. "Srikakulam is an immortal name, a great hope. Srikakulam is the future history of India. Srikakulam will be the bulwark of revolution." This is how Charu Mazumdar assessed the *Girijan* insurgency in Srikakulam. The movement in Srikakulam predates Naxalbari. Besides, the Naxalites achieved a considerable measure of success here and were able to carve out a red area where the writ of the government did not run, even if for a small period only. And yet, for inexplicable reasons, the movement in Srikakulam has not been given as much importance as the movement in West Bengal [3].
2. In the late 1960s, the tribals of Srikakulam District became part of a violent Naxalite movement.

Government officials at state and national level accused the Naxalites of exploiting the poverty and the despair of these scheduled tribes. Government did not at any time deny that the tribals had excellent reasons for being desperately unhappy; only the method for the redress of what were acknowledged to be legitimate grievances were questioned. The poverty they experienced was extreme with chronic hunger a severe problem.. A 1971 government sponsored study noted, in reference to tribals throughout Andhra Pradesh that “although agriculture was the main source of livelihood, it was not giving sufficient returns to save the tribals from starvation... chronic poverty and destitution had become the patterns of tribal life”.

3. The girijan’s impoverished condition was attributable to a number of factors, of which several are human created. The loss of girijan lands to non tribal outsiders and widespread indebtedness are of particular importance. Although both British and post-independence governments created numerous laws to protect the tribals from exploitation at the hands of more sophisticated outsiders, these laws were virtually ignored by the local officials whose responsibility it was to implement them. In light its failure to prevent slippage in the tribals’ economic condition as non tribals prospered, and, more concretely, its failure to uphold the law, government’s claim to legitimacy was extremely fragile. While the Zamindari system was legally abolished under the Estates Abolition act of 1948, by the late 1960s, the government had failed to survey and resettle the tribals; as they still had no *patta* rights, no legal rights to the land they cultivated.
4. The loss of land was usually attributable to the endemic indebtedness in the tribal areas. The indebtedness was so severe that in addition to losing their lands tribals sometimes lost their individual freedom, becoming bonded to the service of a moneylender. Although legislation designed to alleviate tribal inde4btedness came into force in 1960, it was virtually ignored by the government officials responsible for its implementation.
5. Neither the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Moneylenders Regulation, 1960 nor the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Tribes) Debt Relief Regulation, 1960 had any measurable effect.
5. Thus evolved the Girijan Sanghams’ that worked to raise the socio-political consciousness of the tribals and to give them increased confidence in their own capability to struggle effectively for improvement in their lives. Particular efforts were made to unify the girijans and give them a heightened sense of identity. The Sangham taught all the tribals to address each other as “comrades” as a sign of equality and mutual respect. The unity of the tribals was also underscored by the creation of people’s courts. Members of the Sangham were told that they should not bring any arguments that arose among them to the government courts, but should instead bring their disagreements before village or agency committees of Sangham members.
6. Once the Girijan Sangham was organized, with a beginning membership of 1,000, Satyanarayana began a decade of agitations around specific economic issues. While he did meet with some successes- notably in the areas of wages for coolie labour – the decade was marked by landlord violence that was, at best, overlooked by the local government authorities. Thus, more than the failure to protect the girijans economically, it was the failure of the government to protect them from the landlord’s violence that caused violent rebellion.
7. Charu Mazumdar’s visit to Srikakulam in March 1969 gave a spurt to the Girijan insurgency. He advised the Srikakulam leaders to concentrate on annihilating the class enemies, building up guerrilla squads and starting the people’s war.
8. On realising the seriousness of the situation, the government held an inter-state conference of top officials of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh at Vishakapatnam on August 12, 1969 and it was decided to coordinate police action against Naxalites in the bordering areas. In the encounters which followed, important Naxalite leaders like Bhaskar Rao, Thamada

Ganapathy, Nirmala Krishnamurthy, Subbarao Panigrahi and Ramesh Chandra Sahu were killed.

9. The shooting down of Vempatapu Satyanarayana and Adibhatla Kailasam, the two top Naxalite leaders of Srikakulam by the police in an encounter in the Bori hills of Parvathipuram taluk on July 10, 1970 shattered the tribal insurgency in Srikakulam. However, their death did not signify the end of the Naxalite movement in Andhra Pradesh. As we shall see later the volcano was to erupt again in Telangana area with the People's War Group spearheading the movement.

NAXALITE IDEOLOGY

“One man willing to throw away his life, is enough to terrorize a thousand” -Sun Tzu

1. Ever since the success of the revolution in China in 1949, Naxalites had begun seriously studying Mao's works and reports about PLA. They became convinced that the Indian revolution should follow the “Chinese Path” of armed peasant uprising as opposed to the Soviet model of armed insurrection in the cities led by the working class with the support of peasantry [4]. And therefore, Charu Mazumdar's three main formulations before he began his experiment in Naxalbari were:-
 - o The Indian revolution should take the form of armed struggle.
 - o It should take to China's path.
 - o The armed struggle in India should be on the pattern of people's war as advocated by Mao Tse-tung [5].
2. In doing so, the Naxalites often tried to project themselves as an ideology driven group that was fighting for the rights of the 'poorest of the poor'. Unlike most other political ideologies, including other socialist and Marxist ones, Maoism contained an integral military doctrine and explicitly connected its political ideology with military strategy. In Maoist thought, power came from the barrel of the gun and the peasantry could be mobilized to undertake a "people's war".

3. This involves guerrilla warfare using three stages. The first stage involved mobilizing the peasantry and setting up organization. The second stage involved setting up rural base areas and increasing co-ordination among the guerrilla organizations. The third stage involved a transition to conventional warfare. These three stages clearly defined the path followed by the Naxalites in their activities
4. After a period of consolidation from 1980 to 1990, the Naxalite movement relaunched its armed campaign in support of its objectives. The Peoples War Group (PWG) emerged as the single most potent Naxalite organisation. While there were number of Naxalite groups, none could match the PWG as far as firepower and quantum of violence unleashed was concerned.

Contemporary Naxalite Movement

5. After the death of its prominent leaders, dissension within the ranks splits in the party due to factionalism, absence of any charismatic or strong leadership and of course the swift and repressive action taken by the government, the Naxalite movement lost much of its steam between 1970 to 1980.
6. **Organisational Structure.** There is 21-member Central Committee and a seven member Politburo with three regional bureaus i.e. Central, North Eastern and South Western which provide them the ideological support and guidance.

As far as their armed wing is concerned, they have Zonal Committees, each of these few Divisions (company equivalent) and Dalams (platoon equivalent). At village level they have 'Sangam'. These are the over ground active supporters who are ideologically committed to their cause.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT

“For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard As a source of theory it is richer than victory.It accumulates experience and knowledge” - Regis Debray

1. The initial response to the Naxalite Movement in both West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh was the use of force to crush the movement. The government relied heavily on the state police and the paramilitary forces to curb the Naxalite influence in the region. The police they are given a free reign to handle the situation. This resulted in police excesses and allegations of brutality committed by the state forces. The preferred method of eliminating Naxalites was to show them as killed in encounters. There were also allegations of a large number of deaths in custody. The state forces also took recourse to recruiting local unemployed youth and forming resistance groups to tackle the Naxalites.
2. The Naxalite leadership continues to pursue their plan to wage people’s war through the armed struggle to capture political power. They are also acquiring contemporary weapons. Their constant effort is to upgrade technology and sophistication of their weaponry and techniques.

Measures Undertaken by the Government

3. The government made efforts to alter the environmental conditions of those who have turned to the Naxalites for help so that radical groups would have less fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of revolution. The government has a clearly defined policy to combat the challenge posed by the Naxalite menace. This policy comprises the following components[6]:-
 - o The Government will deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence.
 - o Keeping in view that Naxalism is not merely a law and order problem, the policy of the government is to address this menace simultaneously on political security, development and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner.

- o Naxalism being an inter–state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it.
- o The states will need to further improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against Naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly.
- o There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the Naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms.
- o Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in Naxal affected areas so that the potential youth there can be withered away from the path of Naxal ideology.

(g) Mass media should also be extensively used to highlight the futility of Naxal violence and loss of life and property caused by it and developmental schemes of the government in the affected areas so as to restore people’s faith and confidence in the government machinery.

(h) Another related issue is that development activities are not undertaken in some of the Naxalite affected areas mainly due to extortion, threat or fear from the Naxalite cadres. In these areas, even contractors are not coming forward to take up developmental work. Adequate security and other measures would need to be taken to facilitate uninterrupted developmental activities in the Naxal affected areas.

(i) The central government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both - security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem.

4. Counter Measures undertaken by the Government. The Government has taken the following measures to control the Naxal problem:-

- o Modernization of State Police. Funds are given to the States under the Police Modernization Scheme to

modernize their police forces in terms of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, mobility and other infrastructure. The Naxal affected States have also been asked to identify vulnerable police stations and outposts in the Naxal areas and take up their fortification under the Scheme.

- **Revision of Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme in February, 2005.** The level of reimbursement under the Scheme has been raised from 50% to 100% and new items like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation of surrendered Naxalites, expenditure incurred on publicity to counter propaganda of Naxalites, other security related items not covered under the Police Modernization Scheme etc., have been covered. The Scheme also allows release of funds to the Naxal affected States as advance. It is hoped that the revised scheme will enable higher level of utilization of funds under this Scheme.
- **Supply of Mine Protected Vehicles.** Keeping in view the increased casualties of police personnel due to IED/land mine blasts, the Naxal affected States have been provided Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) under the Police Modernization Scheme. Their supply has been streamlined by taking up the matter with the Chairman, Ordnance Factory Board.
- **Long-term deployment of Central Para Military Forces.** In order to supplement the efforts of the States in providing an effective response to the Naxal violence, Central Para Military Forces have been deployed on a long-term basis as requested by the affected States. The Central Government has also exempted the states from the payment of cost of deployment of these forces for a period of three years from 1 July 2004 involving an amount of nearly Rs 1,100 Crores.
- **India Reserve Battalions.** The Naxal affected States have been sanctioned India Reserve (IR) battalions mainly to strengthen security apparatus at their level as also to enable the States to provide gainful employment to the youth, particularly in the Naxal areas. Recently, additional IR battalions have also been approved for the

Naxal affected States. The Central Government will now provide Rs 20.75 Crores per IR battalion as against the earlier amount of Rs 13 Crores per battalion. The States have been asked to expedite the raising of these battalions.

- **Recruitment in Central Para Military Forces.** In order to wean away the potential youth from the path to militancy or Naxalism, recruitment guidelines have been revised to permit 40% recruitment in Central Para Military Forces from the border areas and areas affected by militancy or Naxalism.
- **Backward Districts Initiative (BDI).** Since the Naxalite menace has to be addressed on the developmental front also, the Central Government has provided financial assistance of Rs 2,475 Crores for 55 Naxal affected districts in the nine states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). Under this Scheme, an amount of Rs 15 Crores per year has been given to each of the districts for three years so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social development in the Naxal affected areas. The Planning Commission has been requested to include other Naxal affected areas under their proposed Scheme of Backward Regions Grant Funds (BRGF).

(h) **Tribal and Forest related issues.** In order to address the areas of disaffection among the tribals, the government introduced the Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill 2005 in parliament on 13 December 2005. Further, to facilitate social and physical infrastructure in the forest areas, Ministry of Environment and Forests, as requested by the MHA, issued general approval to allow such infrastructure by utilising upto one hectare of forest land for non-forest purposes. The Ministry also permitted upgradation of kutchra roads constructed prior to 01 September 1980 into pucca roads.

- (i) **Effective Implementation of Land Reforms and Creation of Employment Opportunities in the Naxal Areas.** Naxal groups have been raising mainly land and livelihood related issues. If land reforms are taken up on priority and the landless and the poor in the Naxal areas are allotted surplus land, this would go a long way in tackling the developmental aspects of the Naxal problem. The States have been requested to focus greater attention on this area as also accelerate developmental activities and create employment opportunities in the Naxal affected areas with special focus on creation of physical infrastructure in terms of roads, communication, power as also social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals etc.
5. **Monitoring Mechanisms.** The central government has accorded a very high priority to review and monitor the Naxal situation and the measures being taken by the states on both security and development fronts to control it. Several monitoring mechanisms have been set up at the centre to do so. These include a periodical review by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) relating to the Naxal situation. The states have also been asked to hold a monthly review by the DGP and the Naxal situation and the measures and strategies to contain the Naxal problem.
- RECOMMENDATIONS**
- “If the country does not belong to everyone it will belong to no one”- Tupamaro Manifesto*
1. The options available to the government to tackle the problem remain the same as in conventional terrorist activities. These being the use of armed forces to attempt to contain the terror activities, attempt to remove the root cause behind the movement and enact legislation to enforce the rule of law. In response to conventional terrorism, the weight is on the armed resolution. This is due to the higher level of terrorist activities coupled with the nature of the terrorist demands.
 2. While dealing with Naxalite terrorism, the policy option must heavily weigh on the removal of the root cause. Since the Naxalite movement is a wholly indigenous movement, rightfully addressing the cause will mean the end of the movement. It is of utmost importance to ensure that the Naxalite movement be contained within and not be allowed to join hands with any of the external forces like the LTTE, ISI, Maoists of Nepal or the Turkish and Philippine terrorist organisations. This apprehension stems out from the eagerness with which these agencies would be ready to provide material and moral support to Naxalites to destabilize our country.
 3. Naxalite terrorism has bred in the presence of social and economic disparity and neglect of the legitimate aspiration of the peasantry. Years of apathy has created a situation where the populace is convinced of the inevitability of the armed struggle. The removal of the factors contributing to the continued support to the Naxalite movement centres around the following:-
 - Land distribution and development of agricultural sector.
 - Economic betterment and self reliance to the affected people.
 - Affected states to be free from the influence of international monetary aid agencies for any developmental works being taken up.
 - Restoration of democratic rights of the people.
 - Social justice to backward classes, autonomy to the tribals and resolution of all outstanding issues pertaining to the minorities.
 - Equal rights to the women.
 - Improvement in education and health facilities.
 - (j) Eradication of corruption.
 4. Once the above mentioned issues have been addressed, following action plan is recommended:-
 - Peace talks be held with all the affected parties on the Andhra Model. While doing so, the para military forces should be free to operate in self defence.

- Simultaneously, creation of a unified command with respective Chief Ministers as the political heads, state police heads, bureaucrats and the military component being provided from the geographically located military formations. This should cover the entire 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' covering all affected 15 states.
- In case the talks fall short of the expectations, the contingency planning should cater for the following:-
 - A multi-pronged strategy to combat the Naxalite problem at political, psychological, socio-economic and military levels.
 - Lack of development breeds and fuels insurgent movement. In spite of the opposition by Naxalites, the developmental activities like construction of roads to open up interior areas, provision of safe drinking water, electricity, basic health care and effective public distribution system must be launched at priority in all affected districts simultaneously in a fixed timeframe and with independent monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance.
 - Speedy and pragmatic implementation of land reforms.
 - Modernisation of state armed and normal police force, including provision of protected vehicles to counter the threat of land mines.
- The mass media – television, radio and newspapers – can play a vital role in shaping the public opinion. Terrorists can never win popular support unless they reach the masses to explain their action as something more than random criminal assault. They need wide publicity in order to propagate their cause – right or wrong. Isolation is their greatest enemy.

Use of Army

5. Experience has shown that military is the least suited for the purpose of combating terrorism. Not only does prolonged employment of the army prove to be counter – productive in combating terrorism but it may also have an adverse effect on its primary role of fighting a war. To the terrorists, employment of the army tends to give the

movement an exaggerated sense of strength and portrays a desperate situation to the public. Since its use is the last resort of the government to deal with the situation, it would signify that the terrorists have succeeded in creating a grave situation by giving a complexion of war to an otherwise internal security matter of a country – something which the terrorists would be seeking about. Consequently, it raises their status as a movement. Therefore at the current stage the use of the military to combat the Naxalite movement is strictly not in order.

Use of Police

6. The role played by the police is the most visible aspect of anti – terrorist operations. While other participants carry out their functions in an obscure manner, police operations in strength among the population and in direct confrontation with terrorists, stand out conspicuously over the scene. Because of the nature of involvement of the police, its operation bears the characteristic of producing immediate reaction from the movement as well as the affected public. The main feature of anti-terrorist operations is the inherent compulsion of policemen to seek, identify and apprehend terrorists from among the public. It entails screening of the population. These measures become serious irritants and arouse intense resentment among the people, a vast majority of whom are law – abiding and passively anti – terrorist in their attitude.
7. This is further compounded by the fact that the Naxalites operate with impunity without any regard to the inter-state borders whereas there may be serious legal and bureaucratic hassles for the police force of one state to operate in another state. Therefore the use of the police should be restricted to contain the level of violence to the extent possible while the developmental measures enumerated above are put into effect. This has to be done within the existing laws. While this may seem a tall order, it is necessary that the police are seen as a friendly force and not the repressive arm of the government.

Use of Para Military Forces

8. An alternate to using the police and the army is the use of paramilitary forces. These forces can be specially trained to tackle internal security duties including armed insurrection and terrorist movements. There are a number of advantages using this concept. These are as under:-
 - The most obvious advantage is that such an organisation is specially trained to deal with such difficult situations as riots, terrorist incidents, or insurrections.
 - It does not suffer from the problem of conflicting missions which is the case with both the army (whose primary mission is external defence) and the police (whose primary mission is law enforcement / crime prevention).
 - Such a force would be highly trained in special skills, not involved in routine police work and, therefore, ready to respond in force at very short notice.
 - It saves the police from the most serious confrontations with the public, thereby preserving their basically peace keeping reputations.
9. It is therefore recommended that specialised paramilitary forces be employed to deal with the Naxalite movement in the affected areas. The commanders should be part of the unified command structure. The operations can be conducted by such force without going in legal hassles of operating in more than one state simultaneously.

CONCLUSION


“Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past.” T S Elliot

1. The Naxalite movement in India took off with a small incident in Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal in 1967. What followed was a movement that has ebbed and flown through the three decades of its existence. The scale of the initial Naxalbari uprising has belied the conditions that led to the same. However the turmoil that

was to come in the later years proved the thought that it was a turning point in the history of armed insurrection and leftist violence in India.

2. It differs significantly in its origin, aim, the targets addressed and the importance of public support. It is only in the methodology of their actions that the Naxalite movement is similar to the other terrorist movements in the country.
3. These basic differences suggest that the approach taken to tackle the other terrorist groups will in effect not work in dealing with the Naxalite movement. Therefore the tendency to term the Naxalite movement as a terrorist movement and thereafter proceeding to deal with it in a manner similar to other terrorist organisations needs to be reviewed.
4. Towards this, the Central Government views the Naxalite menace as an area of serious concern. The Government remains firmly committed and determined to address the problem. The current strategy is:-
 - To strengthen intelligence set-up at the state level.
 - Pursue effective and sustained intelligence driven police action against Naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly by the states.
 - Accelerate development in the Naxal affected areas. The Central Government will continue to coordinate and supplement the efforts to the state governments on both security and development fronts to meet the challenge posed by the Naxal problem.
 - Speedy and pragmatic implementation of land reforms.
 - Modernisation of state armed and normal police force, including provision of protected vehicles to counter the threat of land mines

NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS IN INDIA



References

[1] Sachchidanand Pandey. Naxal Violence: A Socio-Political Study. Chanakya Publications, 1985 p. 64.
 [2] Prakash Singh. The Naxalite Movement in India. Rupa and Co, 1995, pp. 91 - 93
 [3] Prakash Singh. The Naxalite Movement in India. Rupa and Co, 1995, p. 37.
 [4] Sachchidanand Pandey. Naxal Violence: A Socio-Political Study. Chanakya Publications, 1985 p. 135.
 [5] Sankar Ghosh. The Naxalite Movement. Firma K L Mukhopadhyay, 1975, p. 25
 [6] <http://www.timesofindia.com>. Status Paper on the Naxal Problem. As tabled by Union Home Minister Mr Shiv Raj Patil in the Parliament on 13 Mar 2006.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CPI (M-L) & PWG

